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Abstract
This paper examines the frequency of new product introductions in monopoly markets
where demand is subject to temporary satiation. Consumerstaste for diversity is satised
over time as new varieties are introduced to the market. If two varieties are introduced in
consecutive periods then they become imperfect substitutes and the rm has an incentive to
raise prices and sell each one to consumers with higher average valuations (better preference
matching). Higher frequency can also generate market expansion. However, under strong
temporary satiation, better preference matching may dominate and the frequency of new
product introductions may become socially excessive.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of product diversity is to better match the preferences of heterogenous consumers
at a point in time, as well as to satisfy individual consumers taste for variety over time. In
markets for leisure goods -such as books, music recordings, movies, computer games, concerts,
etc.-, consumers tend to purchase only one unit of a particular variety, but engage in repeat
purchases in the same product category as new varieties become available. Indeed, in most of
these markets, commercialization and consumption are highly synchronized: most purchases are
typically made immediately following the release of a new variety. For example, approximately
40 per cent of US cinema box-o¢ ce revenues are taken during a movies rst week and very few
movies generate signicant revenue beyond the sixth week.1 ;2 Another important characteristic
of these markets is that demand is subject to temporary satiation. That is, consumption of
the current variety reduces demand for the subsequent variety.3 This begs the question as to
whether suppliers have an incentive to introduce new varieties too quickly or too slowly.
Most studies of product diversity have analyzed static models, where di¤erent varieties appeal
to di¤erent consumer groups.4 This paper does not consider static product diversity but instead
studies the market provision of dynamic product diversity, which is an area that, to the best
or my knowledge, remains largely unexplored. It might be argued that, in examining a narrow
segment of the market (for example, romantic comedies produced by big Hollywood studios,
or historical novels released by major publishing houses), the static dimension becomes less
relevant, whilst the dynamic aspect emerges more clearly.
This paper presents a dynamic model in which a single producer sequentially supplies dif-
ferent varieties of a non-durable good. Both the monopolist and consumers are innitely-lived
and form rational expectations. Consumers are ex-ante identical, but heterogeneous ex-post:
they have random, variety-specic preferences. Each consumer purchases a maximum of one
unit of each variety. The valuation of a new variety by a consumer who has not consumed the
1 In this particular example the synchronization between commercialization and consumption is also inuenced
by two other factors. First, the heavy advertising campaigns leading up to the release date. Second, consumption
externalities play a big role: consumers prefer to purchase a particular variety when aggregate consumption hits
its highest level. The current model ignores these two factors but some of the assumptions generate the same
e¤ects.
2For a useful discussion of common practices and stylized facts in the motion picture industry, see Corts (2001),
Krider and Weinberg (1998), and Einav (2007).
3Einav (2009) has shown that box o¢ ce revenues would increase if lm distributors did not cluster their releases
so much.
4Prominent examples include Salop (1979)s circular city model or Chen and Riordan (2007)s spokes model.
Another workhorse model of product di¤erentiation, the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model (Spence, 1976; and Dixit
and Stiglitz, 1977), describes consumer decisions as emanating from a representative consumerwith a preference
for diversity. But this is only meant as a modeling short-cut rather than as a literal representation of individual
consumer behavior.
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previous variety in the last period is distributed uniformly over the unit interval: If the consumer
did consume in the last period, their valuation is zero with some exogenous probability; whilst
with the complementary probability, it is distributed uniformly over the unit interval: Hence,
satiation occurs with some probability and lasts for one period.
By assuming that consumers are ex-ante identical we avoid Coasian price dynamics, anal-
ogous to those studied in durable goods markets. However, it is crucial that consumers are
heterogeneous ex-post, since this implies that monopoly power generates the standard static
price distortion. The cost of introducing a new variety is independent of the time that has
elapsed since the last variety was introduced. As a result, the timing of product introductions
is entirely demand-driven: it depends only on the speed at which consumers can absorb new
varieties. The degree of product di¤erentiation between two consecutive varieties is exogenous,
which is the main reason for restricting the analysis to the monopoly case. A full analysis of com-
petition would require an explicit examination of how product characteristics are sequentially
selected by di¤erent rms, in which case we would necessarily have to consider static diversity.
The analysis of competition is obviously very relevant, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
The principal research question is therefore the following: How does the monopolys equilib-
rium frequency of introduction of new products compare with the socially-optimal frequency?
Given that satiation lasts for only one period, the question can be reduced to analyzing whether
new varieties are introduced each period (high frequency) or every other period (low frequency).
In a low-frequency equilibrium, any two varieties are independent; consumption of a partic-
ular variety does not a¤ect the expected utility of the next available variety. As a result, prices
and consumer behavior coincide with those of the one-shotequilibrium. In contrast, in a high-
frequency equilibrium, two consecutive varieties are imperfect substitutes. Consider the extreme
version of the model in which the monopolist does not discount the future and consumers are
satiated, with probability of one, if they consumed the previous variety. In this case, one sale
today exactly crowds out one sale tomorrow. Also, if a consumer declines to make a purchase
today they may still make a purchase tomorrow. In other words, the monopolist has two inde-
pendent opportunities to make a sale. Since consumer preferences are variety-specic, then the
monopolist faces a more homogeneous demand: the highest of two independent draws is less
dispersed than a single draw.5 As a result, the monopolist nds it optimal to set a higher price
than when in a low-frequency equilibrium and sell each variety to consumers with higher average
valuations. Clearly, the same intuition applies to the general model, although discounting and
5 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting several intuitions, including this one.
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the probability of no satiation reduces the degree of substitutability between two consecutive
varieties.
In static models it has been shown (see, for instance, De Meza and Von Ungern-Stenberg,
1982) that a monopolist may provide excessive or insu¢ cient variety with respect to the social
optimum. The reason for this is that a new variety generates market expansion as well as better
preference matching. If the rst e¤ect dominates, then a non-discriminating monopolist is unable
to capture all the surplus generated by the new variety and thus has less incentives than the
social planner to introduce a new variety. If the second e¤ect dominates then the monopolist
can sell each variety to a more homogeneous consumer group, and hence charge a higher price.
Thus, the additional variety enables the monopolist to capture a larger share of the surplus
from the infra-marginal varieties. As a result, the extra prot may exceed the incremental social
value, generating excessive variety.
Similar e¤ects are present in the model adopted in this paper. As a result, the equilibrium
can also be characterized by insu¢ cient, or excessive, dynamic product variety.6 The probability
of temporary satiation is the crucial determinant of the balance between market expansion and
better preference matching. If temporary satiation is weak, then two varieties introduced in
consecutive periods are poor substitutes. Thus, shifting from low- to high-frequency raises
consumer surplus, since consumers can enjoy new varieties more often at similar prices (market
expansion dominates). In this case, the monopolist has incentives to introduce new varieties
more slowly than the social planner. However, as temporary satiation becomes stronger then,
along a high-frequency path, the monopolist charges higher prices and is able to appropriate a
larger share of the surplus in all periods. As a result, the incentives of the monopolist and the
social planner are better aligned. If temporary satiation is su¢ ciently strong, then scenarios
will exist in which the better preference matching e¤ect dominates and equilibrium frequency
of introduction of new products is socially excessive.
Temporary satiation in non-durable goods is somewhat analogous to depreciation or quality
improvements in durable goods, in the sense that they both induce repeat purchases and gen-
erate a negative link between past purchases and current demand. If sellers introduce quality
improvements over time then we can also consider the optimality of its frequency.7 The litera-
6 In the baseline model the equilibrium frequency of introduction of new products is unambiguously too slow
with respect to the second-best benchmark. However, for other welfare benchmarks, as well as for various
extensions of the baseline model, the equilibrium frequency may be too slow or too fast, depending on parameter
values.
7The literature on depreciating durable goods has focused on very di¤erent issues; for instance, on the role of
replacement sales in preventing the Coase conjecture (Bond and Samuelson, 1984; Driskill, 1997), or the e¤ect of
scrapping subsidies (Adda and Cooper, 2000).
4
ture on product innovation (quality upgrading) in durable goods, in line with the results of this
paper, has shown that a monopolist may introduce more upgrades than is socially optimal (see,
for instance, Waldman, 1993; Choi, 1994; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1998). These papers present
two-period models and focus on network externalities and compatibility between old and new
models. Their results are hardly comparable with those of the present model.
The study most closely related to this one is Fishman and Rob (2000). They examine the fre-
quency of innovations generated by a durable-good monopolist in an innite-horizon framework,
with homogeneous consumers. They show that a monopolist introduces new products too slowly
with respect to the social optimum (at least in the case of no planned obsolescence). The reason
for this is that innovations are cumulative. Hence, current innovation e¤orts have a positive
e¤ect on all subsequent models, but consumers are willing to pay only for the incremental ow
of services that the current model provides. The two models di¤er in two important respects.
First, the current model allows for (ex-post) heterogeneous consumers; hence the static price
distortion becomes a crucial ingredient of the analysis. Second, it examines the provision of
di¤erent varieties of a non-durable good, instead of quality upgrades of a durable good. Conse-
quently, it can be safely assumed that innovation e¤orts are independent over time (in contrast
to the notion of cumulative innovations). Finally, independent, variety-specic preferences look
more plausible in the context of horizontal rather than vertical di¤erentiation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model, in which consumers
and the rm discount the future at the same rate. Some preliminary results are derived in section
3. Sections 4, 5 and 6 analyze the full equilibrium for the baseline model. Section 7 examines the
case of myopic consumers, and section 8 o¤ers some concluding remarks and discusses further
extensions.
2 The baseline model
An innitely-lived monopolist sequentially supplies di¤erent varieties of a non-durable good.
In each period the monopolist can introduce a new variety by incurring a xed cost, : Any
amount of the variety can then be produced at a constant marginal cost, which is normalized to
0: Each time a new variety is introduced, previous varieties cease to be available. The monopolist
chooses both the timing of introduction of new varieties and their prices in order to maximize
the expected discounted value of prots. Time periods are indexed by t; t = 0; 1; 2::: and the
discount factor is denoted by ,  2 [0; 1).
There is a mass one of innitely-lived consumers with history-dependent preferences. Each
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consumer purchases, at most, one unit of each variety and the utility derived from each con-
sumption episode is variety-specic. In particular, if consumer i did not consume in period t 1,
then their valuation of the variety introduced in period t, rit, is a random variable, uniformly
distributed in the interval [0; 1] (distribution NC). Alternatively, if consumer i did consume in
period t  1, then rit is a realization of distribution C; such that:
rit =

0, with probability 1  
 uniform on [0; 1] , with probability 
where  2 [0; 1) is a xed parameter: Valuations of those consumers who do not purchase
the new variety immediately remain constant over time, until either they purchase one unit of
this variety or a di¤erent variety is introduced.
Conditional on no consumption in t   1, a consumers expected valuation of a new variety
in period t is 12 : However, if a consumer did consume in t   1 then their expected valuation is

2 <
1
2 : Thus, 1    measures the intensity of consumerstemporary satiation. Note that, for
simplicity, temporary satiation lasts only for one period.
Distributions of valuations and past purchases are common knowledge. Thus, at the begin-
ning of each period, based exclusively on this information, the monopolist decides whether or
not to introduce a new variety. If it does, then it also announces the (constant) price prevailing
throughout the varietys life span (until a new variety is introduced). Immediately following the
launch of a new variety, consumers learn their individual valuations of the current variety, as well
as its price, and make their purchasing decisions. If there is no product innovation during that
period then consumers can still access the last variety at the price announced at the moment of
its launching.8
Consumers are ex-ante identical but heterogenous ex-post. They all obtain the same long-
run expected utility but they disagree about the value of each specic variety. The assumption
of independent draws over time (except for the satiation e¤ect) encapsulates the idea that
consumers cannot foresee the order in which future varieties will be introduced and learn their
characteristics only when they become available. Such ex-post heterogeneity implies that, at
any point in time, the monopolist faces a continuous, downward sloping demand function.
Let us denote by xt the fraction of consumers that are not satiated in period t; i.e., those
who obtain a positive realization of rit. Clearly, xt will depend on xt 1 and consumption in t 1;
in a way that will be specied below. Thus, x0 is one of the exogenous parameters of the model,
8More generally, if the rm can set, when the new variety is introduced, the sequence of prices prevailing during
its life span, then a constant price is an optimal commitment policy, and hence all results would be identical.
Moreover, in section 8 I argue that, in the absence of any short-run commitment power, the main qualitative
results of the paper would still remain largely una¤ected. If anything, the main message would be reinforced.
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but xt; for all t > 0; are endogenous variables. For simplicity, attention is restricted to the case
of x0 = 1: It will become apparent later that considering an arbitrary value of x0 2 [0; 1] would
complicate the analysis without generating any signicant insight.
Consumer i obtains a net surplus of rit pt if she chooses to consume in period t at a price pt:
Otherwise she obtains 0: Consumers take their consumption decisions in order to maximize the
expected discounted value of their net surpluses and, unless explicitly indicated, they discount
the future using the same discount factor, :
In summary, this is a model with three independent parameters, ; ; . The fourth para-
meter, x0; has been xed equal to 1.9 For future reference we will dene !   (1  ). Such a
combination of parameters will be an important determinant of equilibrium variables, indicating
that strong temporary satiation (low values of ) will have a substantial e¤ect on equilibrium
variables only if agents are forward-looking and value the future su¢ ciently (high ).
3 Preliminary analysis
The role of some key assumptions. Some of the specic assumptions presented in the
previous section have important implications that facilitate the analysis considerably. Firstly,
the assumption of constant prices for each variety avoids intra-variety Coasian dynamics and
implies that, in equilibrium, there is perfect synchronization between commercialization and
consumption.10 Secondly, the assumption of ex-ante identical consumers prevents the emergence
of inter-variety Coasian dynamics. That is, if a new variety is introduced every period, since all
consumers share the same perception of the future, then the monopolist is concerned only with
the fraction of unsatiated consumers, but not with the composition of current demand in terms
of (ex-ante) consumer types. As a result, it is possible to construct an equilibrium in which all
varieties are sold at the same price. Third, the assumption of a uniform distribution allows us
to compute closed-form solutions.
Interpretation of the model. Given the above, the current model aims at understanding
how the frequency of introduction of new varieties is determined in markets in which consumers
typically purchase a single unit of each variety, but in which the recent history of purchases a¤ect
the valuation of new varieties -consider, for example, the case of lms and books. Most of these
markets exhibit a high correlation between commercialization and consumption.11 The model
9Note that I use Greek letters to denote parameters and Latin letters to denote endogenous variables.
10Section 8 examines this issue in more detail.
11 In the case of music recordings and computer games consumers typically make a repeated use of each variety.
To the extent that most of these consumption episodes occur right after the acquisition of the good, then the
model can be thought of as tting these markets as well.
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is su¢ ciently abstract to ensure that the characteristics of subsequent varieties (and therefore
the distancebetween them) need not be made explicit. Consequently, alternative interpreta-
tions are also possible. For example, the model can also capture the case of highly perishable
goods (live performances) that are available exclusively at particular points in time. Whether or
not the goods supplied at various moments are physically di¤erent is not important under this
interpretation. Finally, those markets where essentially the same variety is continuously avail-
able, but consumers experience temporary satiation (for example, amusement parks, restaurants,
tourist destinations), also match the preference structure relatively well, whilst other aspects of
the model considerably less so.
The nite-horizon game. The (subgame perfect) equilibrium properties of the nite
horizon games will be used to construct the candidate equilibria of the innite horizon game.
After an inactive period, that is, a period with no product innovation (and no consumption),
all consumers will have recovered from their previous consumption episodes. Hence, history
will not matter any more and the economy will revert to its initial condition, x = 1: Also, in
the period before the inactive period, consumers and the rm care only about their short-run
payo¤s, since their current decisions will not a¤ect their continuation utility. Hence, the main
building block of our analysis will be a nite horizon game in which some consecutive innovative
periods (a new variety is introduced in each of them) are followed by one inactive period (no
innovation). In particular, a variable with superscript n (in contrast to subscripts that refer to
calendar dates) will denote the equilibrium value of such variable if agents expect the current
innovative period to be followed by n consecutive innovative periods, n  0. Hence, according
to this convention, period n is followed by periods n  1; n  2; :::; 0:
Period 0: In the last period all agents anticipate that their current decisions cannot a¤ect the
future, and hence they will simply maximize their short-run payo¤s. More specically, consumers
will purchase the good if, and only if, their valuations are higher than the current price, r0i  p:
That is, consumersthreshold value is r0 (p) = p: Given such consumer behavior, the rm will
choose p in order to maximize short-run prots, x0 (1  p) p; and hence will optimally choose
p0 = 12 : Thus, the rms continuation value at the beginning of period 0 is 
0
 
x0

= x
0
4   :
A consumers continuation value at period 0 will depend on whether or not she has consumed
during the previous period. In particular, if a consumer has not purchased the good in period
1 then her continuation value in period 0 is U0NC =
R 1
1
2
(r0i   12)dr0i = 18 : In contrast, if she
did consume in the previous period then her continuation value is smaller, U0C =

8 , since with
probability 1  the consumer will be satiated and hence stay out of the market: It is important
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to note that neither the price nor consumer behavior depends on the value of the state variable,
x0:
Consumer behavior in period n; n > 0: The notation introduced above can no be
generalized. Let Un 1C and U
n 1
NC denote the consumerscontinuation value at the beginning of
period n 1, conditional on having and not having consumed, respectively, in period n. Consumer
is payo¤, if she chooses to purchase the good in period n, is rni   p + Un 1C : Alternatively,
if consumer i does not purchase the good, then her payo¤ is Un 1NC : Notice that both U
n 1
C
and Un 1NC are independent of r
n
i : Hence, all consumers adopt the same optimal decision rule:
purchase the good if, and only if, rni  rn (p) = p + gn, where gn (the gap) is given by gn =

 
Un 1NC   Un 1C

: That is, gn represents consumers option value of waiting; by declining to
purchase the current variety a consumer increases her future expected utility by an amount
gn. If we let pn be the equilibrium price and rn the value of the threshold in equilibrium,
rn = rn (pn), then:
gn = rn   pn: (1)
Continuation values can be written in a recursive form:
Un 1NC = CS(p
n 1; rn 1) + rn 1Un 2NC +
 
1  rn 1 Un 2C
Un 1C = U
n 1
NC + (1  ) Un 2NC
where CS(pn 1; rn 1) =
R 1
rn 1
 
rn 1i   pn 1

drn 1i . That is, if a consumer did not purchase
the good in period n; then with probability one they will obtain a positive valuation in period
n   1, and hence their short-run expected utility is given by CS(pn 1; rn 1): Also, with prob-
ability rn 1 they do not purchase and their discounted continuation value is Un 2NC : With the
complementary probability, 1  rn 1, they purchase the good and their discounted continuation
value is Un 2C : Alternatively, if the consumer did purchase the good in period n, with probability
, their expected payo¤ will be exactly the payo¤ of those consumers who abstained in period n
and, with probability 1 ; their valuation will be zero and their discounted continuation value
will be Un 2C :
If we subtract these two equations and use equation (1) we obtain:
gn = !

CS(pn 1; rn 1)   1  rn 1 gn 1 = !
2
 
1  rn 12 (2)
If consumers expect the next period to be innovative then they become more selective than in
the case when the next period is inactive, and only purchase the good if their current valuations
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are su¢ ciently higher than the price. In other words, because of temporary satiation, current
and future varieties become imperfect substitutes and hence consumers are willing to give up
some current surplus in exchange for a higher future surplus.
The rms optimization problem. Suppose that in period n the rm expects consumers
to behave according to rn (p) = p + gn; where gn is independent of p: In this case, the rms
objective function is

xn (1  gn   p) p  F + n 1  xn 1	 ; where n 1  xn 1 is the rms
continuation value at the beginning of period n   1: Crucially, xn 1 depends on the current
price, p. More specically, if a mass xn (1  gn   p) of consumers purchase in period n then a
fraction (1  ) of them will be out of the market during the next period and hence the transition
function will be:
xn 1 = 1  (1  ) (1  gn   p)xn (3)
The optimal price is characterized by the rst-order condition of the rms optimization
problem:
1  gn   2pn + !kn 1 = 0 (4)
where kn 1 = d
n 1
dxn 1 . By raising the price above the short-run prot maximizing level,
1 gn
2 ,
the rm incurs short-run losses, but enhances future prots by raising the fraction of non-satiated
consumers.
The current optimal price will thus depend on kn 1: By the envelop theorem:
kn = (1  rn) (pn   !kn 1) (5)
and by taking into account the rst-order condition (4):
kn = (1  rn)2 (6)
That is, if gn is independent of the current price, then pn only depends on rn 1 and gn;
which in turn also depends on rn 1: Once again, backward induction will be crucial in order to
complete the argument. Since r0 is independent of x0, then g1 is also independent of x0: Also,
we have shown above that k0 = 14 : Hence, from equation (4), p
1 is independent of both x1 and
x0; and from equation (1) r1 is also independent of x1 and x0: We can apply this argument
iteratively and conclude that in equilibrium gn is independent of
 
xn 1; xn 2; :::; x0

and the
current price, and hence equilibrium is fully characterized by equations (1), (2), (4) and (6),
which can be conveniently rewritten as:
rn =
1
2
+
3!
4
 
1  rn 12 (7)
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pn =
1
2
+
!
4
 
1  rn 12 (8)
Summarizing this discussion:
Lemma 1 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium prices and consumer behavior are given
by r0 = p0 = 12 , and for n > 1 by equations (7) and (8).
Equilibrium in period 1: For future reference it we will be useful to point out the equi-
librium values in period 1 : p1 = 12 +
!
16 ; g
1 = !8 ; k
1 =
 
1
2   3!16
2
:
The limit of the nite-horizon game as n goes to innity. Also, it is crucial to
consider the limiting values of these variables as n goes to innity, since they will be relevant
to construct, for the innite-horizon game, equilibria where the monopolist introduces a new
variety every period. Notice that the di¤erence equation (7) denes an oscillatory trajectory
that converges to r1, which is given by:
r1 =
2 + 3!  p4 + 6!
3!
Equation (8) indicates that pn also follows an oscillatory trajectory that converges to:
p1 =
2 + 6!  p4 + 6!
9!
Obviously, r1 > p1; for ! > 0: Also, if ! = 0 then p1 = r1 = 12 and both increase with !:
Finally, it is clear from equation (6), that kn also converges to k1. If ! = 0 then k1 = 14 and
it decreases with !: Instead of providing the exact expression for k1 as a function of !; it will be
more helpful to o¤er an alternative characterization. Evaluating equation (5) at kn = kn 1 = k1
we obtain:
k1 =
(1  r1) p1
1 + ! (1  r1)
That is, the marginal e¤ect of the current state variable on the rms value can be expressed
as the adjusted value of the short-run prots generated. The adjustment is due to the fact that
a higher value of the current state variable will involve lower sales in the future.
The rms value can be written as a function of the current state variable:12
1 (x) = xk1 +
k1   
1  
12The continuation value in period t is (xt) =
P1
s=0 
sxt+s [(1  r1) p1   ] ; where xt+s = 1  
(1  ) (1  r1)xt+s 1:Operating and dropping the subscript of the initial period we obtain the expression in the
main text.
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Low-frequency equilibria. For the innite-horizon game I will characterize equilibria in
which a new variety is introduced every other period (low frequency, L). In this case, in all
innovative periods p = p0 = r = r0 = 12 : The rms continuation value, 
L (x), is:
L (x) = 0 (x) +
20 (1)
1  2 =
x
4
   + 
2
 
1
4   

1  2 :
Finally, total consumer surplus in a low-frequency equilibrium, UL (x), is:
UL (x) = xCS
 
r0; p0

+
2CS
 
r0; p0

1  2 =
x
8
+
2 18
1  2
High-frequency equilibria. I will also study high-frequency equilibria (H) in which a
new variety is introduced every period, and where consumer and rm behavior are the limit of
the nite-horizon game as n goes to innity. Notice that in a high-frequency equilibrium the
monopolists sells each variety to relatively more homogeneous consumers than in a low-frequency
equilibrium; their valuations are uniformly distributed over [r1; 1], where r1 > 12 : As a result,
it charges a higher price: p1 > 12 : The rms continuation value along such equilibrium, 
H (x) ;
is:
H (x) = 1 (x)
Total expected consumer surplus can also be written in a similar fashion:
UH (x) = xu1 +
u1
1  
where:
u1 =
CS (r1; p1)
1 + ! (1  r1)
4 The innite-horizon game: high-frequency equilibria
In this section a Markov perfect equilibrium is constructed, where a new variety is introduced
every period. While the existence of multiple (high-frequency) equilibria cannot be ruled out,
the proposed equilibrium can be understood as an equilibrium selection based on the nite-
horizon model. In fact, it can be shown that this is the only equilibrium in which all varieties
are equally priced.
Let us denote by qt the variable that indicates whether or not a new variety is introduced in
period t; i.e.,qt 2 f0; 1g, qt = 1 indicates that t is an innovative period and qt = 0 that t is an
inactive period.
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Since x is the fraction of unsatiated consumers in the current period, we can write the
monopolists strategy as follows:
If x 2 [x; 1] ; q (x) = 1 and p (x) = p1
If x 2 [0; x) ; q (x) = 0 (9)
where x = k1 : Similarly, suppose consumers adopt the following decision rule:
r (p; x) =

p+ g1 if p  ep (x)
p; otherwise
(10)
where ep (x) = 1  g1   1 x(1 )x : The value of x is given implicitly by the equation H (x) =
H (1). Hence, since H (x) increases with x then, conditional on the price p1 and consumer
behavior given by r (p; x) = p+ g1, the rm nds it optimal to introduce a new product if, and
only if, x  x. Along the equilibrium path it must be the case that the state variable is always
higher than x: If the rm sets the price p1 and consumers behave according to r (p; x) = p+g1;
and since the transition function is (analogous to (3)):
xt+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  g1   p)xt (11)
then the lowest value of xt is x1 = 1   (1  ) (1  g1   p1) : Condition x1  x is equivalent
to p1  ep (1). Since ep (x) increases with x, then p1 is higher than ep (x) for all x.
Hence, if the rm restricts itself to p  ep (xt) then, for all t; xt  x; and according to the
results of section 3; consumersoptimal behavior is given by r (p; x) = p+ g1: Also, the optimal
price conditional on p  ep (x) and r (p; x) = p+ g1 is p1.
Consumer behavior must be optimal not only along the equilibrium path, but also for any
value of the state variable and at any price. Given the transition function (11), then xt+1  x
if, and only if, p  ep (x) : Hence, if p  ep (x) consumersoptimal response is r (p; x) = p + g1.
Finally, if p < ep (xt) then consumers should expect that the next period is inactive, xt+1 < x.
Hence, in this case, the optimal response is r (p; x) = p:13
The proposed strategies will form a Markov perfect equilibrium only if some additional
requirements are fullled. In particular,  must be such that x1 is higher than x: Moreover,
we need to ensure that the monopolist does not have incentives to deviate by setting a price
below ep (x) ; in order to try to exploit consumershigher propensity to purchase. The Appendix
shows how to compute the threshold value; H ; that denes the range of values of  for which
a high-frequency equilibrium exists.14
13 It is important to notice that in the current formulation all consumers face the same price. This is why they
can use the current price to make inferences about future product development plans. As discussed in Section 8,
if consumers were exposed to a distribution of prices, then the inference problem could dramatically change.
14The next section will discuss how di¤erent parameters a¤ect the threshold value H .
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Proposition 2 There exists a threshold value H > 0; such that strategies (9) and (10) support
high frequency as a Markov perfect equilibrium if, and only if,   H :
5 The innite-horizon game: low-frequency equilibria
In this section, a Markov perfect equilibrium is constructed in which the monopolist introduces
a new variety every other period.15 Consider the following strategy for the monopolist:
If x 2 [x; 1] ; q (x) = 1 and p (x) = 12
If x 2 [0; x) ; q (x) = 0 (12)
where x = max
n
2
3  ;
+4
1+
o
. Similarly, suppose consumers adopt the following decision rule:
r (p; x) =
8>><>>:
p; if x 2 [x; 1] , and p < p (x)
p+ g1; if x 2 [x; 1] , and p  p (x)
p; if x 2 [0; x) , and p  p (x)
p+ g1; if x 2 [0; x) , and p > p (x)
(13)
where p (x) = 1  1 x(1 )x , p (x) = 1 g1  1 x(1 )x : If  is relatively high, then the threshold value
of x to introduce a new product, x, is given by x = +41+ ; which is the value of x that satises
L (x) = L (1). Hence, conditional on price 12 and consumer behavior, given by r (p; x) = p,
then the rm prefers to introduce a new variety if, and only if, x  x: Along the equilibrium
path prices and consumer behavior are p0 = r0 = 12 : Also, it must be the case that, along the
equilibrium path, for all xt  x, xt+1 = 1   (1  ) 12xt < x: That is, an inactive period must
follow every innovation period. Such a condition is x  23  . If +41+ < 23  , then we need to
x x equal to 23  : Notice that in this case, conditional on price
1
2 and consumer behavior given
by r (p; x) = p, if x  x the rm prefers to introduce a new variety, since L

2
3 

> L (1).
From results in section 3, if the rm restricts to p < p (x) then consumersoptimal behavior is
r (p; x) = p, and the rms optimal price is 12 .
Optimal consumer behavior is somewhat more complicated that in a high-frequency equi-
librium. If x  x, consumers will expect no innovation in the next period, and hence will
behave according to r (p; x) = p, only if the price is su¢ ciently low for such expectation to be
self-fullling: p < p (x). Otherwise, consumers will expect one more innovative period, followed
by an inactive period. Hence, from results in Section 3, they will optimally behave according
to r (p; x) = p + g1. If x < x, and in order to minimize the rms incentives to deviate, such
a threshold has been set at a lower value; that is, consumers expect no innovation in the next
15Whereas price and consumer behavior along the equilibrium path are uniquely determined by the results
obtained in section 3, there is still room for multiple equilibria, which can be the result of di¤erent behavior out
of the equilibrium path.
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period only if p  p (x) < p (x) : Again, if p > p (x), consumers will expect one more innovative
period followed by an inactive period.
For this type of equilibria, as suggested by the more complicated consumer strategy, the
rms optimal deviation strategy may potentially involve di¤erent prices. In particular, we need
to check that if x < x the rm does not have incentives to innovate, and set a price above or below
p (x) : The Appendix shows that, depending on parameter values, the optimal deviation strategy
may actually involve a price higher or lower than p (x) ; and hence either one can determine the
minimum value of ; L; compatible with a low-frequency equilibrium. Also, note that if  is
too high the monopolist never wants to introduce a new product. Hence, the existence of a
low-frequency equilibrium requires   0:25:
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold value L > 0; such that strategies (12) and (13) support
low frequency as a Markov perfect equilibrium if, and only if,   L; 0:25 :
Multiplicity of equilibria. Table 1 reports the values of various thresholds for di¤erent
values of (; ). In particular, it shows that H can be higher or lower than L. More specically,
if the discount factor is su¢ ciently high and temporary satiation is su¢ ciently strong (low ),
then H  L. Consequently, if  2 L; H there exist multiple equilibria. That is, alternative
consumer beliefs can be self-fullling. The intuition for this is as follows: if consumers expect at
x0 = 1 that new products will be introduced every period then they nd it optimal to purchase
only if the their current net surplus is su¢ ciently high (higher than g1). Given such consumer
behavior, the monopolist prefers to set a relatively high price, p1, leading to a low level of sales,
and a high level of the state variable in the next period, x1: In period 1, a high level of x1
will provide the right incentives to continue innovating. Alternatively, if consumers expect that
the next period will be inactive, then they nd it optimal to purchase for any positive current
surplus (g0 = 0). In this case, the monopolist sets a relatively low price, 12 , which results in a
high level of sales, and a low level of x1. If x1 is low then the monopolist prefers to wait for one
period to introduce a new variety.16
Non-existence. If  is not so high, then H < L for all values of , and hence if
 2 H ; L none of these two types of equilibria exist.17
16Whenever two pure strategy equilibria exists then it is very likely that a mixed strategy equilibrium also
exists. In such equilibrium, after one inactive period the monopolists introduces a new product with a certain
probability. Explicit consideration of this type of equilibria would ad very little.
17The search for other Markov perfect equilibria is very hard because of two features of the model. First,
consumers hold expectations about a discrete variable (the number of consecutive innovative periods), and hence
optimal behavior is discontinuous in (x; p). Second, the state variable, x, in a high frequency equilibrium oscillates:
high values tend to be followed by low values and viceversa.
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Comparative statics. Table 1 also provides some comparative static results. In particular,
both H and L increase with : Table 1 only reports these thresholds for two values of , which
suggest that both H and L decrease with . Further (unreported) numerical simulations
indicate that this is indeed the general pattern. Summarizing, these thresholds decrease with
the intensity of temporary satiation, !.
6 Welfare analysis
This section examines the e¢ ciency of equilibria, as well as the distributional implications. I
rst study the preferences of the two types of agents over the frequency of introduction of new
products, and next the preferences of a social planner that maximizes total surplus.
The rms ex-ante optimal frequency. The rms payo¤ from low- and high-frequency
paths are given by L =
1
4
 
1 2 and 
H = k
1 
1  ; respectively. Hence, the rm prefers high
frequency if, and only if,   m; where such threshold value is:
m =
1 + 

k1   1
4
The proof of Proposition 3 includes the following result:
Remark 4 H > m:
That is, there exist a range of values of  for which the monopolist is trappedin a high
frequency equilibrium, whereas it would like to commit to a low-frequency path.
Consumersoptimal frequency. Total consumer surplus obtained in a low- and high-
frequency equilibria are given by UL =
1
8
1 2 and U
H = u
1
1  , respectively. In this case the
comparison is unambiguous:
Remark 5 UH > UL:
As discussed above, u1 increases with ; however, even if  = 0, u1 > 18(1+) and hence
consumers are better o¤ in a high-frequency equilibrium. In spite of the higher prices, consumers
benet from the greater product variety.
The social optimum (second best). Consider a social planner whose goal is to maximize
total surplus, TSj = j + U j ; j = L;H: Suppose the social planner can choose the frequency
of introduction of new products but cannot a¤ect monopoly pricing. Then, the social planner
prefers high frequency if, and only if,   sb; where sb is given by:
sb =
1 + 

(k1 + u1)  3
8
16
Let us proceed in two steps. First, compare the incentives of the monopolist under full
commitment with those of the social planner. Since consumers always prefer high frequency and
the monopolist does not internalize the e¤ect of frequency on consumer surplus, then a social
planner would choose high frequency more often than the monopolist. That is:
Remark 6 sb > m:
Hence, under commitment the monopolist would tend to introduce products too slowly (too
little dynamic variety). However, in the absence of commitment, we learned above that high
frequency can result in equilibrium for values of  higher than m (Remark 5): Thus, whether or
not excessive product variety may occur in equilibrium will depend on the distance between H
and m: In particular, if H   m was su¢ ciently high then the possibility of excessive product
variety would arise, in spite of the rms ex-ante bias in favor of low frequency. However,
numerical simulations (See Table 1 for an illustration) indicates that this is not the case:18
Proposition 7 When consumers discount the future at the same rate as the monopolist, the
frequency of introduction of new products is either socially optimal or insu¢ cient; that is, sb >
H :
Thus, in the baseline model, and from a second-best perspective, ine¢ cient equilibria are
always characterized by insu¢ cient product variety (low frequency emerges in equilibrium, while
high frequency would deliver higher total surplus).
The discussion below will reveal that this result is not very robust. At this point, it will be
su¢ cient to note that sb   H is the result of two countervailing e¤ects. In the extreme case
of no temporary satiation,  = 1; there is no intertemporal link, since xt = 1 independently of
past behavior: In this case, the monopolist either innovates every period (if  < 0:25) or it never
does (if  > 0:25).19 The monopolist has lower incentives than the social planner to introduce
new products (to be active in the market) simply because higher frequency only generates
market expansion, which raises consumer welfare (sb = 0:375). However, as  falls, the e¤ect
of which is magnied by a high discount factor, a countervailing e¤ect becomes stronger. In
this case, the monopolist considers it to be relatively more attractive to introduce new varieties
every period because it can sell each variety to a more homogeneous consumer group and hence
charge a higher price. Thus, shifting from a low- to a high-frequency path also generates better
preference matching (which benets the rm and hurts consumers).
18Like the other thresholds, m and sb also increase with  and decrease with .
19 In other words, as  goes to 1 both H and L converge to 0:25:
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It turns out that, in the baseline model, the rst e¤ect dominates. That is, the additional
prot obtained from shifting from a low- to a high-frequency path is lower than the social benet
(that is, the equilibrium frequency is insu¢ cient). But there is no substantial reason for such
unambiguous result. In fact, relatively minor modications of the baseline model (see sections 7
and 8) can generate equilibria with excessive frequency, if ! is su¢ ciently high. The specication
of the welfare benchmark also matters, as discussed below.
The rst-best frequency. Until now, the focus has been on a second-best scenario. Alter-
natively, however, we could consider the case where the social planner can control the frequency
of introduction of new products as well as the price. The working paper version (Caminal, 2011)
shows that in this case the social planner can implement the rst-best allocation by setting the
price equal to marginal cost (zero) and choosing the optimal frequency conditional on such pric-
ing rule. In this case, it can be shown that if  is lower than a certain threshold,  () > 0, then
the social planners threshold, fb, is lower than m and H : That is, the equilibrium frequency
may be higher than in the rst best, fb < H . Moreover, the possibility of excessive product
variety survives even if we let the monopolist commit to its optimal ex-ante frequency, fb <
m.20
7 The frequency of new product introductions with myopic con-
sumers
The previous analysis has been conducted under the assumption that consumers and the rm
discount the future at the same rate. Such an assumption is likely to be extreme. One could
argue that consumers tend to use a lower discount factor than rms. This section considers the
case of completely myopic consumers (where consumersdiscount factor is set to zero). This
can be interpreted as an extreme version of an extension that allows consumers to discount the
future more than the monopolist.
If consumersdiscount factor is zero, some of the preliminary results derived in section 3
need to be adjusted. If we denote the equilibrium variables for the case of myopic consumers
with a hat, then it is clear that bgn = 0 for all n: Of course, it is still the case that bp0 = br0 = 12 :
However, for n > 0 we need to evaluate equations (4) and (6) at gn = 0: Then, by taking the
limit as n goes to innity, we obtain:
20Presumably, in a rst best scenario, the social planner can compensate the rm for xed costs using revenue
from non-distortionary taxation. Another more realistic welfare benchmark would allow the planner to control
price and frequency but impose a break-even constraint (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting
this benchmark). In this case, I would expect results somewhat in between those obtained using the two other
welfare benchmarks.
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bp1 = br1 = 1 + !  p1 + !
!
Note that bp1 is equal to 12 if ! = 0; and increases with !. Moreover, bp1 > p1. The reason
is simple: myopic consumers exhibit a lower demand elasticity (demand functions shift upwards
by a constant g1), and hence the optimal price is higher than in the case of forward-looking
consumers. Naturally, such a demand boost leads to higher prots and lower consumer surplus.
In particular: bk1 = (1  bp1) bp1
1 + ! (1  bp1) > k1
bu1 = 12 (1  bp1)2
1 + ! (1  bp1) < u1
The rms optimal frequency. Given that consumers behave myopically, then the rms
optimization problem is time consistent. Hence, even in the absence of commitment, the mo-
nopolist can implement the ex-ante optimal frequency of introduction of new products. The
rms payo¤ from introducing new varieties every other period (low frequency) is bL = 14 
1 2 ;
and every period (high frequency) is bH = bk1 1  : Therefore, a high-frequency equilibrium is
preferred by the monopolist, bH  bL, if and only if   bm, where bm is given by:
bm = 1 + 

bk1   1
4
The social optimum (second best). Suppose the social planner cannot a¤ect monopoly
pricing but can choose the frequency of introduction of new products in order to maximize the
expected discounted value of total surplus. Since bUL = 18
1 2 and
bUH = bu11  , and total surplus iscTSj = bj + bU j ; j = L;H; then the social planner prefers high frequency if, and only if,   bsb,
where bsb is given by: bsb = 1 + 

bk1 + bu1  3
8
(14)
Hence, bm   bsb = 1


1
8
  (1 + ) bu1
The next proposition shows that bm may be higher or lower than bsb; depending on the
intensity of temporary satiation. That is, the frequency of introduction of new products cho-
sen by the monopolist may be insu¢ cient or excessive from the point of view of total surplus
maximization.
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Proposition 8 When consumers are myopic, the frequency of introduction of new products can
be excessive if temporary satiation is su¢ ciently strong. More specically, for all  > 0; there
exists a threshold value, b () 2 (0; 1) such that bm > bsb if, and only if,  < b ().
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. The likelihood of excessive diversity depends
on ; but also on : Indeed, the threshold b () increases with . That is, excessive diversity is
more likely as  falls and  increases. Thus, these two parameters are imperfect substitutes in
the generation of excessive diversity. The reason is that both, a lower  and a higher ; make
two consecutive varieties better substitutes.
As in the baseline model, obtaining excessive or insu¢ cient product variety depends on
the net balance of two countervailing e¤ects: (i) market expansion (which works in favor of
insu¢ cient product variety); and (ii) better preference matching under high frequency (which
works in favor of excessive variety). Under myopic consumers, the di¤erence is that the second
e¤ect dominates, provided temporary satiation is su¢ ciently strong. The reason is that myopic
consumers do not anticipate the consequences of current consumption on future utility and
engage in excessiveconsumption. As a result, along a high-frequency equilibrium, consumers
become less demanding (they purchase every time they obtain a positive surplus, in contrast to
the minimum surplus, g > 0, required by forward-looking consumers). Such an upward shift
in demand induces higher equilibrium prices, and a transfer of rents from consumers to the
rm: u1 > bu1 and k1 < bk1: As a result, the extra prot obtained by shifting from low- to
high-frequency may exceed the incremental social value.
8 Concluding remarks
Absence of short-run commitment power. The previous analysis was conducted under
the assumption that the monopolist sets a constant price for each variety. If, on the contrary,
the monopolist cannot commit to keeping the price of each variety constant over its life span
(until a new variety is introduced), then prices and consumer behavior along a low-frequency
path would be di¤erent. In particular, in this case the monopolist would have an incentive to
reduce the price in the second period of the varietys life span and sell it to consumers with lower
valuations (who did not make a purchase in the rst period at the regularprice). Clearly, the
expectation of such a price reduction would decrease consumerswillingness to pay in the rst
period. In this scenario, as in literature on durable-goods monopoly, the inability to commit to
a constant price reduces monopoly prots along any low-frequency equilibrium. Since the rms
short-run incentives to deviate from the prescribed strategy remain constant, the range of values
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of  that can support a low-frequency equilibrium would shrink (higher L). Analogously, the
range of values of  that support a high frequency equilibrium would expand (higher H), since
prots along a high-frequency path remain constant, but incentives to deviate are reduced. In
summary, in the absence of short-run commitment, a high-frequency equilibrium would be more
likely. Moreover, it could even be the case that H > sb; and hence, if  2 sb; H ; there
would exist an equilibrium in which the frequency of introduction of new products is socially
excessive.21
Welfare analysis (summary and additional remarks). The equilibrium frequency of
introduction of new products does not always coincide with the socially optimal. Shifting from
low to high frequency generates market expansion but also better preference matching. The
relative strength of these two e¤ects depends on the intensity of temporary satiation, but also
on other aspects. If consumers discount the future at the same rate as the monopolist and can
use the current price to make predictions about future product development plans, then as the
intensity of temporary satiation increases, social and private incentives become better aligned.
However, in this case, ine¢ ciency always takes the form of insu¢ cient dynamic diversity, sb >
H .
Alternative scenarios would give rise to the possibility of obtaining excessive diversity. As
discussed in the previous section, if the welfare benchmark is the rst best (the social planner
controls the frequency of introduction of new products as well as prices), and if temporary
satiation is su¢ ciently strong, then equilibrium frequency may be socially excessive, fb < H .
Even if we adhere to the second-best benchmark, the sign of sb   H is very sensitive to some
changes in the specication of the model. In particular, if consumers are myopic (section 7), and
the intensity of temporary satiation is su¢ ciently strong, then sb is lower than H . One would
expect that, by continuity, the same result could be obtained if consumers are forward-looking
but their discount factor is su¢ ciently lower than the rms.
Finally, I will argue that excessive dynamic variety, sb < H ; is also possible in this model
even when consumersdiscount factor is the same as the rms. In particular, we could consider
an scenario where prices faced by individual consumers involve some idiosyncratic perturbation
(retail prices do experience some geographic variation in the real world). In particular, we
could assume that the price faced by consumer i in period t; pit; is made of two components,
21Even in the absence of commitment power, if consumers strongly prefer to purchase the new variety during the
innovative period, perhaps because of positive consumption externalities, then commercialization and consumption
would again be perfectly synchronized. Krieder and Weinberg (1998) argue that externalities are indeed present
in the case of the motion picture industry, where viewers prefer to watch the lms immediately following their
release, when total consumption is at their peak.
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pit = pt + it; where pt is the (wholesale) price set by the monopolist and it is an i:i:d random
variable with zero mean (normalized retailers mark-up). Consumers observe their individual
prices, pit; but not the average price, pt. In this case, along a high-frequency equilibrium, pit will
a¤ect consumer is decision in period t, but not her beliefs about future product development
plans.22 The reason for this is that in equilibrium, consumers expect the price, p1, to be
set with probability one, and any pit 6= p1 must be attributed to the idiosyncratic shock.23
That is, in this case consumer behavior is given by r (pit; xt) = pit + g1 for all xt; pit: In this
scenario it is easy to show that a high-frequency equilibrium can be sustained for higher values
of : The intuition is that consumer expectations are now more rigid, and the monopolist is no
longer tempted to deviate by setting a su¢ ciently low price that induces a change in consumer
expectations. In fact, sb is in this case lower than H ; if  is su¢ ciently low.24
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 3 (high-frequency equilibria)
Since x = k1 then x1  x; is equivalent to:
  b = k1 [1  (1  ) (1  r1)] (15)
Also, we need to check that the monopolist does not have any incentives to deviate and set
a price below ep (x). The threshold ep (1) could be higher than 12 . In particular, ep (1)  12 if, and
only if, x  1  (1  )  12   g1 : Since x = k1 then this condition is equivalent to:
  a = k1

1  (1  )

1
2
  g1

(16)
Clearly, a < b: If ep (1)  12 , since ep (x) is an increasing function of x; then there is a range
of values of x, including x = 1; for which the optimal deviation is to set a price equal to 12 :
That is, prots from the deviation would be x14    + 21 (1), which have to be lower than
xk1    + 1 (1). Clearly, incentives to deviate are maximized at x = 1. Notice that at
23
x = 1 the no deviation condition means that the rm ex-ante prefers high frequency over low
frequency. That is:
  m = 1


(1 + ) k1   1
4

(17)
It can be checked that m < a; i.e., conditions (16) and (17) are incompatible and hence
there is no equilibrium with ep (1)  12 :
Since ep (1) < 12 then the optimal price in case of a deviation is ep (x) : The expected payo¤
from deviating is xep (x) [1  ep (x)] +21 (1) which has to be lower than xk1 +1 (1) :
Once again, the highest deviation incentives occur at x = 1 and hence the no deviation condition
is:
  1

f(1 + ) k1   ep (1) [1  ep (1)]g (18)
The left hand side of (18) is a convex function of  that reaches a minimum at  = a and
takes the value m (< a). Since the right hand side of (18) is the 45o line, then the lowest value
of  that solves (18) with equality, H , lies in the interval (m; a) : Plugging the denition ofep (x) and x = k1 into (18), then H is the lowest solution to the following quadratic function:
 =
1


(1 + ) k1  

1  g1   1 

k1
1  

g1 +
1  k1
1  

(19)
Consequently, if   H ; then a high-frequency equilibrium exists. It is important to em-
phasize that H > m. This means that that there is a non-empty interval

m; H

for which
a high-frequency equilibrium exists, whereas the monopolist would would like to commit to low
frequency. QED
10.2 Proof of Proposition 4 (low-frequency equilibria)
1) Suppose xt 2 [0; x). If p < p (xt) and consumers behave according to r (p; xt) = p then
xt+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  p)xt < x: Alternatively, if p  p (xt) and consumers behave according to
r (p; xt) = p+ g
1 then xt+1 = 1  (1  )
 
1  p  g1xt  x. In both cases, consumers behave
optimally. Let us consider a possible deviation from the rms equilibrium strategy: suppose
q (xt) = 1:
1a) Consider the case x = 23  : Since p

2
3 

= 12   g1, and p (x) increases with x; then
p (xt)  12   g1 < 12 . Hence, provided p  p (xt) ; and since consumers behave according to
r (p; xt) = p; the optimal price is p (xt) : In this case, prots are equal to xtp (xt)

1  p (xt)
  
 + 2L (1) ; which need to be lower than L (1) : Clearly, the highest incentives to introduce
a new variety are at xt = x: That is, a low-frequency equilibrium requires that:
  L1 = (1 + )
2
3  

1
4
   g12  
4
(20)
Alternatively, if the monopolists sets a price above p (xt) ; since consumers behave according
to r (p; xt) = p + g1; then the optimal price is p1 and prots are equal to xtk1    + L (1) :
Once again, incentives to introduce a new variety increase with x; and hence a low-frequency
equilibrium requires that:
  L0 =
2
3  k
1 (21)
Note that L1 can be higher or lower than 
L
0 depending on parameter values.
1b) Consider the case x = +41+ >
2
3  : Now the optimal price, conditional on pt  p (xt) is
min

1
2 ; p (xt)
	
: Prots from introducing a new variety increase with x; and are bounded above
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by x4   + 2L (1) : Since x = +41+ this upper bound is equal to L (1). Therefore, it is not
protable to introduce a new variety. Finally, conditional on pt  p (xt), and since the highest
incentives to innovate are at x = x; prots from innovation are equal to +41+ k
1    + L (1).
That is, deviation is not protable if:
  k
1
1 +    4k1
Such a condition is implied by (21):
2) Suppose now xt 2 [x; 1] : If p < p (xt) and consumers behave according to r (p; xt) = p then
xt+1 = 1  (1  ) (1  p)xt < x: Alternatively, if p  p (xt) and consumers behave according to
r (p; xt) = p+ g
1 then xt+1 = 1  (1  )
 
1  p  g1xt  x. In both cases, consumers behave
optimally.
Also note that p

2
3 

= 12 , In the main text it has already been shown that, conditional
on p < p (x) since consumers behave according to r (p; xt) = p; the optimal price is p = 12 and
q (x) = 1 is optimal. Suppose now the monopolist deviates and sets a price above p (x) : In this
case consumers behave according to r (pt; xt) = pt + g1: From Section 3, the optimal price is p1
and prots are equal to xk1    + L (1). Prots from the deviation increase with x at the
rate k1; but prots from p = 12 increase at the rate
1
4 > k
1: As a result, incentives to deviate are
the highest at x = x:If x = 23  then xk
1    + (1)  (1)  (x) : The rst inequality
is implied by (21). Hence, (21) is also a su¢ cient condition for a non-protable deviation. If
instead x > 23  then prots from the deviation are equal to
+4
1+ k
1    + (1) which is lower
than (x) = (1) if, and only if:
  k
1
1 +    4k1
which is again implied by   L0 . Summarizing, a low-frequency equilibrium exists if, and
only if,   L = maxL0 ; L1 	 ; which are given by equations (20) and (21). QED
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   TABLE	  1	  
                      δ = 1.00                     δ = 0.50 
µ γH	   γL	   γm	   γsb	   γH	   γL	   γm	   γsb	  0.00	   0,0669	   0,0651	   0.0502	   0,0753	   0,0807	   0,1211	   0.0560	   0,0840	  0.05	   0,0722	   0,0702	   0.0558	   0,0838	   0,0869	   0,1257	   0.0629	   0,0943	  0.10	   0,0778	   0,0774	   0.0617	   0,0926	   0,0933	   0,1303	   0.0700	   0,1049	  0.15	   0,0836	   0,0850	   0.0679	   0,1018	   0,0999	   0,1352	   0.0773	   0,1159	  0.20	   0,0897	   0,0929	   0.0743	   0,1115	   0,1067	   0,1402	   0.0848	   0,1272	  0.25	   0,0960	   0,1009	   0.0811	   0,1216	   0,1137	   0,1453	   0.0926	   0,1389	  0.30	   0,1027	   0,1090	   0.0882	   0,1323	   0,1209	   0,1507	   0.1006	   0,1509	  0.35	   0,1097	   0,1174	   0.0957	   0,1435	   0,1284	   0,1562	   0.1089	   0,1634	  0.40	   0,1170	   0,1260	   0.1036	   0,1553	   0,1360	   0,1618	   0.1175	   0,1762	  0.45	   0,1248	   0,1347	   0.1119	   0,1678	   0,1439	   0,1677	   0.1264	   0,1896	  0.50	   0,1330	   0,1438	   0.1207	   0,1810	   0,1521	   0,1738	   0.1356	   0,2033	  0.55	   0,1417	   0,1530	   0.1300	   0,1950	   0,1605	   0,1802	   0.1451	   0,2176	  0.60	   0,1508	   0,1625	   0.1399	   0,2098	   0,1692	   0,1867	   0.1550	   0,2325	  0.65	   0,1606	   0,1723	   0.1504	   0,2256	   0,1782	   0,1935	   0.1652	   0,2478	  0.70	   0,1709	   0,1823	   0.1617	   0,2425	   0,1875	   0,2006	   0.1759	   0,2638	  0.75	   0,1820	   0,1927	   0.1737	   0,2606	   0,1971	   0,2080	   0.1870	   0,2805	  0.80	   0,1938	   0,2034	   0.1866	   0,2800	   0,2071	   0,2157	   0.1985	   0,2978	  0.85	   0,2064	   0,2145	   0.2006	   0,3009	   0,2173	   0,2237	   0.2106	   0,3158	  0.90	   0,2199	   0,2259	   0.2157	   0,3235	   0,2280	   0,2321	   0.2231	   0,3347	  0.95	   0,2345	   0,2377	   0.2321	   0,3481	   0,2389	   0,2408	   0.2363	   0,3544	  1.00	   0,2500	   0,2500	   0.2500	   0,3750	   0,2500	   0,2500	   0.2500	   0,3750	  
